C Raja Mohan Indo Pacific Is Here To Stay Japan Takaichi

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to India this week highlights one important fact — the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical construct will live on. Whatever Washington’s reasons are for restoring the name Pacific Command, the logic of the Indo-Pacific will continue to drive key regional actors like India and Japan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit later this month to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand will reinforce the proposition. In sum, the Indo-Pacific will remain a critical theatre of India’s national economic and security strategy.

It was the Trump administration that officially adopted the Indo-Pacific lexicon in 2017, during its first term. At the time, many in India’s strategic community viewed the concept with deep suspicion. Was Washington trying to lure India into an anti-China alliance? Was this another attempt to compromise India’s strategic autonomy? Today, the anxiety has simply reversed. If Washington no longer emphasises the Indo-Pacific, does it mean America is abandoning Asia? Is it preparing to build a condominium with China?

Both reactions overestimate Washington’s power to define India’s strategic environment. What they reveal is a self-generated anxiety in Indian strategic discourse that swings wildly between concerns about American “entrapment” and fears of American “abandonment”.

The Indo-Pacific construct, when it emerged in the early 2000s, reflected the changing distribution of economic and military power in Asia driven by China’s rise and assertion. What Americans call that reality matters less than the fact that Beijing’s neighbours have no option but to deal with it — with or without American support.

In any case, the Indo-Pacific was not an American invention. Its modern political articulation came from Japan. In August 2007, during his historic address to the Indian Parliament, the late Shinzo Abe spoke of the “Confluence of the Two Seas”. His argument was both simple and profound: The destinies of the Indian and Pacific Oceans had become inseparable, and the democracies along their littorals needed to work together to preserve an open regional order.

For Abe, this was not diplomatic rhetoric. It reflected Japan’s assessment that China’s rise had fundamentally altered Asia’s strategic balance. The old Cold War alliance system centred exclusively on northeast Asia would no longer suffice. Japan needed stronger partnerships with India, Australia, Southeast Asia and Europe while reinforcing its alliance with the United States. The Indo-Pacific became the organising principle for that broader strategy.

Nearly two decades later, Prime Minister Takaichi has become the principal custodian of Abe’s vision. Rather than retreating in the face of Washington’s change of emphasis, Tokyo has doubled down. Speaking at Vietnam National University in Hanoi in May, Takaichi unveiled an updated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, reaffirming the concept’s validity despite shifts in American policy. Her updated framework places new emphasis on resilient supply chains, critical minerals, economic security, maritime cooperation and stronger partnerships across the region.

The outcomes from Takaichi’s visit will reflect that strategy. Tokyo and Delhi are preparing a joint declaration on economic security that, according to Japanese officials, will register their shared opposition to economic coercion. The two sides are expected to identify priority sectors, from semiconductors and critical minerals to clean energy, and to commit to coordinating their response when coercion is used.

Ironically, perhaps the strongest validation of the Indo-Pacific idea comes from China itself. Beijing dismisses the Indo-Pacific as an artificial construct. Yet, its own policies increasingly integrate the two oceans into a single strategic theatre. Over the past two decades, China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy and African resources has steadily grown.

Beijing has built overland economic corridors linking western China to the Indian Ocean, established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, maintained a continuous naval presence across the Indian Ocean and developed an expanding network of dual-use commercial facilities stretching from Southeast Asia to the east coast of Africa. Chinese strategy increasingly treats the Indian and Pacific Oceans as one connected maritime space — which is precisely the logic underlying the Indo-Pacific concept.

India recognised this transformation nearly a decade ago when it formally embraced the Indo-Pacific as the widening arena of its strategic interests. There is little reason to abandon that framework simply because Washington has altered its vocabulary. Delhi need not become captive to American enthusiasm or American indifference.

The Indo-Pacific ultimately rests not on American terminology but on Asian geography and Asian power politics. As China expands simultaneously into the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and as Japan emerges as an increasingly capable strategic actor, the integration of the two oceans will only deepen.

The Indo-Pacific, then, is a structural reality of Asian politics, not a shifting American narrative. India should focus on building its own capabilities and deepening partnerships with like-minded Indo-Pacific countries to strengthen the regional balance of power.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is also associated with the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University and the Council on Strategic and Defense Research, Delhi