Great Nicobar Task Pursuing National Security With Ecological Responsibility

A state that does not secure its frontiers, alliances and trade routes cannot secure its future.” Kautilya’s lesson, written into the grammar of statecraft centuries ago, has returned with unusual force in our time. Nations today are again being tested not merely on the size of their economies or the strength of their armies, but on their ability to read geography, anticipate the future and act before opportunity turns into vulnerability. Great Nicobar is one such test for India. Located close to some of the most important seaways of the Indo-Pacific, Great Nicobar is one of India’s most important strategic windows to the world. That is why the proposed development cannot be understood merely as an infrastructure project. It is a strategic test of whether India is prepared to convert a rare geographical advantage to further bolster its Comprehensive National Power. For centuries, the Indian Ocean shaped India’s destiny, carrying our trade, ideas, civilisational influence and, at times, our vulnerabilities. Yet, for much of the post-Independence period, India’s strategic imagination remained heavily continental. Great Nicobar is one of the largest islands in the archipelago, with an area of about 910 sq km. The total project area of 166.10 sq km is only about 2 per cent of the total area of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, of which 130.75 sq km, approximately 1.82 per cent of the total forest area of the islands, is proposed for diversion. Great Nicobar lies close to Southeast Asia and sits near major global sea lanes. Read | Great Nicobar Project: Bhupender Yadav rejects Jairam Ramesh’s charges, defends environmental clearance Its importance becomes clearer when viewed from the strategic lens of the high seas. Imagine the ships moving from the Gulf of Aden towards the Malacca Strait, energy cargo sailing from West Asia and Africa towards East Asia, container traffic connecting Asia, Africa and Europe, naval assets, surveillance platforms and logistics chains moving through these waters. The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming a crowded strategic arena. Energy flows, container traffic, naval deployments, island facilities, undersea cables and maritime surveillance are now part of a larger contest that is decisive for the future of nations. Recently, Thailand shelved a decades-old proposal for a canal connecting the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand. Instead, an overland 90 km multi-modal land bridge connecting two newly designed deep-sea ports along the 10th parallel — one in Ranong on the Andaman Sea and another in Chumphon on the Gulf of Thailand — along with dual-track high-speed rail, multi-lane roads, energy pipelines for oil and gas and an air-digital grid, is pending final approval. All these factors redefine the Indo-Pacific trade route and shift the economic centre of gravity to the Andaman basin. The Strait of Malacca is among the world’s most important chokepoints. It connects the Indian Ocean with the Pacific and carries energy (oil and LNG) and commerce of enormous value. Great Nicobar’s Galathea Bay is about 45 km from the Six Degree Channel, which connects the Malacca Strait with routes leading towards Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Around 1 lakh ships pass annually through the Malacca Strait-Six Degree Channel route. The island’s proximity to the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok chokepoints gives India a significant strategic advantage. Across the IOR, powerful countries are steadily expanding their presence through ports, logistics arrangements, maritime access facilities, naval assets, surveillance systems and economic corridors. India’s answer must be strategic consolidation. Sovereignty is strengthened when territory becomes connected, inhabited, serviced, productive and strategically usable. The International Container Transshipment Port, greenfield airport, township and power plant will together create the ecosystem needed for India to maintain a credible, sustained and multidimensional presence at a decisive maritime location. The National Green Tribunal, after due diligence and consideration of observations, acknowledged the project’s great significance not only for the economic development of the island and the surrounding areas of strategic location, but also for defence and national security. Singapore did not become a great maritime hub merely because it was well located. It built capacity around that location. Location gave it the opportunity, and its infrastructure converted that opportunity into influence. Diego Garcia offers another lesson from the Indian Ocean. It shows how a remote island, when equipped with logistics and operational infrastructure, can acquire outsized strategic significance. Great Nicobar allows India to do this in a balanced and distinctly Indian way. It can support trade and strengthen national security, reduce dependence on foreign transhipment hubs, enhance India’s maritime reach and serve as a gateway to Southeast Asia and a platform for the wider Indo-Pacific. A transhipment port at Great Nicobar can reduce dependence on foreign ports, improve supply-chain resilience, attract investment, generate employment and give India greater certainty over the movement of its own cargo. Of course, Great Nicobar is environmentally sensitive. Any project of this scale must be implemented with ecological care, legal compliance, scientific monitoring and genuine mitigation. But ecological sensitivity cannot become a permanent veto on strategic thinking. The challenge is to pursue national security with ecological responsibility. The real question is whether India wants to responsibly develop a strategic island, or whether it will leave that island under-connected at a time when the entire Indo-Pacific is being reorganised. India is both a continental and maritime power. For too long, the continental mind overshadowed the maritime one. The Great Nicobar project is, therefore, not extravagance, but strategic foresight. A nation’s destiny is shaped not only by the threats it faces, but by the opportunities it recognises in time. Great Nicobar is one such opportunity. To neglect it would be to leave geography unused and vulnerable to being shaped by others. To develop it wisely would be to turn geography into a strength. India does not need to apologise for thinking strategically. It only needs to act responsibly, decisively and with a clear sense of national interest. In the Indo-Pacific century, Great Nicobar is not the edge of India. It is India’s watchtower at the gateway of the future. The writer is Lieutenant Governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and vice chairman of the Islands Development Agency. He is a former chief of the naval staff and was commander-in-chief of the A&N Command during 2009-10